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The working class was the most important target for British and American propaganda in 
Norway during the early Cold War. The propagandists found eager allies in certain 
Norwegian Labour Party partisans, who wanted support in their struggle against communist 
and Soviet influence. Party Secretary Haakon Lie became their key contact. Soon after the 
war, he started propaganda cooperation with the British Labour Party, as well as the British 
and US Embassies in Oslo, mostly on his own initiative. New opportunities arose with the 
onset of the Cold War and the establishment of secret Western campaigns to influence public 
opinion abroad. From 1948 onward, anti-communist propaganda poured into Norway, 
reaching a peak during the Korean War. In the early 1950s the British Foreign Office, the US 
State Department and the CIA’s Congress for Cultural Freedom were all cooperating with the 
Norwegian Labour Party. This article gives an overview of the transnational dissemination of 
propaganda through Labour’s party and union apparatus, arguing that the Western 
propagandists’ remarkable reach towards the Norwegian labour movement and working class 
was a cultural ‘empire by invitation’. 
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In March 1945, two months before the German capitulation in Norway, and amid on-going 
discussions about forming a united Norwegian labour party of both social democrats and 
communists, Haakon Lie (1905-2009) wrote a letter from Washington D.C. to his mentor and 
party comrade Martin Tranmæl. He warned that the rhetoric of reconciliation coming from the 
communists’ leadership at the time, like that of their ideological brothers elsewhere, was 
merely a mask for their true intentions: 
We should carefully avoid blind hatred towards the communists. What I see here 
– and what I saw in Canada – however, makes me more and more suspicious. The 
communists are just as dishonest as before – just as ruthless in their fight for 
power. […] There are no grounds for cooperation with such a movement, and if 
we let them in on us, our own movement will be consumed from within. The 
communists are obviously enormously strengthened and energized by the Russian 
prestige. But there were those other than the Russians who contributed in this war. 
I know a good deal about the contribution of the English-speaking democracies, 
and in Norway I would like to tell people about that. That is one of the reasons I 
want to go home.1  
Haakon Lie had spent much of the Second World War touring the industrial regions of North 
America, promoting the cause of the Norwegian resistance and securing financial support 
from the American and Canadian labor unions.2 Years later, he concluded that he had gotten 
so attached to American society that he would probably have stayed if he had been younger.3 
Like most of his party comrades, Haakon Lie had enthusiastically supported the building of 
socialism in the Soviet Union in the interwar years, but turned decisively against the Soviets 
after the German-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 1939 and the outbreak of the Winter 
War in Finland.4 After a short period of aggressive anti-communism, many members of the 
Norwegian Labour Party (Det norske Arbeiderparti) reverted to more favorable views of the 
Soviet Union and the communists, in light of their tenacious fight against Nazi Germany from 
1941. Haakon Lie did not share these comrades’ newfound sympathy, and his view of the 
international communist movement as a treacherous and possibly dangerous adversary was 
presumably the sharpest expression of a general skepticism that prevailed in the party 
leadership. The letter to Tranmæl set the tone for Lie’s engagement as an anti-communist 
propagandist in the coming decade. Entering the Cold War, he would devote much of his 




progressiveness of the American and British societies, and of the totalitarian threat 
represented by the communists and the Soviet Union. 
To what extent and how did Haakon Lie cooperate with foreign individuals, organizations and 
states in the transnational dissemination of political propaganda5 to and from Norway from 
1945-55? Seen through the transnational contacts of Party Secretary Lie, what was the 
Norwegian Labour Party’s position in, and main contributions to, early transnational Cold 
War propaganda networks?6 Focusing on Haakon Lie as an important ‘node’ in a vast 
transnational network confines the study. I propose the term ‘critical editor’ to describe Lie’s 
forging of strategic connections and his strong influence on the initiation, creation, 
translation, adaptation and strategic dissemination of propaganda. 
Since the late 1960s the Cold War has been a major field of investigation among Norwegian 
historians. During the first decades of Norwegian Cold War historiography, the main focus 
was on foreign and security policy, diplomacy, international economic cooperation, Norway’s 
position in the NATO alliance, military strategy and nuclear policy.7 Considering Labour’s 
political dominance in the decades after 1945, it was to be expected that many of these studies 
focused on the inner life of the party and its cabinets.8 Since the 1990s, works have 
highlighted political surveillance and anti-Communism in Norway during the Cold War, 
much of it directly involving the Labour organizations.9 Internationally the ‘Cultural Cold 
War’ has emerged as a substantial new historical field since the 1990s. Works have focused 
on the international propaganda campaigns run by the US State Department and the British 
Foreign Office, as well as the regional and national manifestations of the Cultural Cold War.10 
With its intriguing links to the CIA, the Congress for Cultural Freedom has been one major 
object of interest.11 The historiography of the early Cold War era in Norway is extensive and 
some contributions, most notably by Helge Danielsen on US public diplomacy in Norway in 
the 1950s, have touched upon the battle for the hearts and minds of Norwegians during the 
early Cold War.12 Certain pieces of information concerning the US contribution to and 
financing of some Labour publications in 1950-51 surfaced in the 1990s, yet no historians 
have done an in-debth analysis of Labour’s involvement in the dissemination of propaganda 
through transnational networks in the early Cold War.13 
To get a comprehensive picture of Haakon Lie and Labour’s position in and main 
contributions to such networks towards Norway’s signing of the Atlantic Pact in 1949 and the 
consolidation of the Cold War in the 1950s, it is crucial to include the immediate post-war 
era, when cautious propaganda scuffles between the great powers as well as between 
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communists and social democrats took place, long before ‘the Cold War’ was a term on 
everyone’s lips.  
 
Propagating Westernism 
In 1945 Western Allies were militarily present in most of Norway except for Finnmark, where 
the Soviets stood with the Red Army. During the autumn these Allied armies left Norwegian 
soil. Their propaganda apparatuses did not. After the British Labour Party under Clement 
Attlee had taken over the cabinet in late July, the propagandists at the British Embassy in 
Oslo started cooperating with the Norwegian Labour Party. To the Foreign Office they 
reported to have supplied Labour with 34 films ‘for showing at pre-election party meetings.’14 
The report summed up different channels for the dissemination of material in Norway and this 
was the only mention of contributions to a political party. There is reason to believe that the 
newly elected Party Secretary of Labour, Haakon Lie, who had returned to Norway in August, 
was involved in the arrangement. He operated the daily correspondence with all branches and 
regional offices of the highly centralized party, as well as the party’s international 
connections. As one of the leading party strategists, he also actively worked on the election 
campaign. Lie’s major fields of expertise were political schooling and propaganda. It is hard 
to imagine that the British films could have bypassed his office. It is rather more probable that 
he tried to make his party benefit from the successful election campaign of the British Labour 
Party for Norwegian Labour Party’s own campaign before the Norwegian parliamentary 
elections held on the 8th of October. 
What we do know is that Haakon Lie initiated similar contacts with the US Embassy, most 
notably with Walter Galenson, who was sent to Oslo as a Labor Attaché in May 1945. In his 
first months in Norway, Galenson found it hard to establish contacts within the Norwegian 
labour movement. That changed in the late summer, when he got acquainted with Haakon 
Lie. According to Galenson, Lie drew him into a confidential cooperation, even securing 
technical support in his party’s election campaign: 
I went electioneering with him. He was very interested at that time in showing 
TVA [Tennessee Valley Authority] films about how we had harnessed the water 
falls, because they were pushing that water fall business there. So I got a hold of 
some of the TVA films. We would go to [a] small town and he would give an 




Probably illegally... When the Ambassador heard about it, he was a little bit 
worried, but he didn’t complain.15  
Through motion pictures Haakon Lie propagated the story of Roosevelt’s New Deal flagship 
to potential voters. The goal seems to have been twofold, to show the progressiveness of 
democratic America and to instill in the audience the impression that Labour had equally 
ambitious plans for the reconstruction of Norway. Approaching the elections, the labour 
movement was on the offensive. In June, Einar Gerhardsen, a Labour politician recently freed 
from German captivity, became Prime Minister. Two communists became ministers in his 
interim coalition cabinet. The Norwegian Communist Party (NKP) and Labour had prepared 
themselves better for their return to legal political life than the non-socialist parties, which, to 
a great extent, paused their activities during the five years of occupation.16 Owing to the broad 
recognition of the sacrifices made by both the Soviet Union and the communist resistance 
groups in the fight against Nazi Germany, the NKP had won public support and thousands of 
new members and adherents during the war, among them many old members of Labour. From 
a pre-war existence as a political sect, they entered the political scene of liberated Norway as 
a substantial force with mass support. The NKP had a new, national profile and a conciliatory 
rhetoric emphasizing parliamentary democracy, cooperation with ‘progressive forces’ in 
society and a peaceful road to socialism.17  Union grassroot demands for a unified labour 
party led to negotiations between Labour and NKP in the summer, but strong mutual distrust 
among the party leaders made the joining of forces unfeasible, which created widespread 
disappointment in the unions.18 The labour parties faced the elections as independent forces 
competing for the same working class votes. 
The election results demonstrated that the war had moved the public opinion dramatically to 
the left. For the first time, the labour parties together received more than 50 percent of the 
popular vote. The NKP got 11.9 percent, while Labour got 41 percent, which won the latter a 
parliamentary majority it would retain until 1961. Shortly after the elections, the labour 
educational organization Arbeidernes Opplysningsforbund (AOF) published a pamphlet on 
American productivity committees during the war based on material gathered by Haakon Lie 
in the USA. Marjorie Galenson from the US Embassy, an academic married to the Labor 
Attaché, had prepared it for publication.19 In return for their services to the Norwegian Labour 
Party, the Galensons were kept informed about labour politics and communist-linked topics, 
information that they reported back to the State Department.20 
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In early 1946 Haakon Lie worked to publish a pamphlet on the heroic war effort of the British 
unions. He had written the text in Great Britain during the war and had Fabian Society in 
London revise and update it with the British Embassy as intermediary.21 Though it is unclear 
whether the re-publication materialized, it represented one of the first of many attempts by 
Lie in the post-war era to present the British labour movement as a positive and relevant 
model in Norway. By that time, he had established confidential contacts with the two British 
propagandists Press Attaché Kit Kenney and Press Reader John Inman. In January 1946 Lie 
began to receive background material from Inman. In a letter Inman thanks Lie for an 
‘enjoyable evening’ at Lie’s home, then emphasized that the origin of certain articles he 
supplied, the likes of which he offered to continue providing, had to be kept secret: ‘You can 
make any use you like of these, provided that my name is not mentioned and there is no kind 
of reference to the Embassy or Foreign Office.’22 
As with Haakon Lie’s cooperation with the Americans, such ad-hoc and small-scale efforts 
were initiated by Lie and his personal contacts at the British embassy. They were not the 
result of a coordinated policy. Presumably, that was the background for a dispatch from 
Ambassador Laurence Collier to Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin in March 1946, where 
Collier emphasized the importance of the attitude of the Norwegian labour movement for 
positive British-Norwegian relations. He advised that further efforts should be made to 
support a group within the Norwegian Labour Party that wanted to see closer connections to 
the British labour movement, ‘because they want to develop united labour action on an 
international basis, but also because they want to set up a focus of interest which would 
counter the inclination towards Russia which might otherwise exist in the Norwegian working 
class.’23 Only much later would Bevin respond to such encouragements with a coordinated 
British propaganda policy to counter pro-Soviet sentiments in Norway. 
Lie’s propaganda seems to have been quite uncontroversial within the labour movement in the 
first post-war year. The pamphlet on US productivity committees was even recommended by 
the communist daily Friheten (The Freedom), illustrating that such texts were not perceived 
as anti-Soviet.24 A conciliatory spirit prevailed in the political debate. Few saw the East-West 
divide as unbridgeable and there was hope for the possibilities of international cooperation 
through the United Nations, which was even headed by the former Norwegian Foreign 
Minister, Labour politician Trygve Lie. The Gerhardsen cabinet followed a policy of ‘bridge 




relations and polite cautiousness towards the Soviets, but no real efforts to construct any 
diplomatic or ideological bridges.25 
 
Skirmishes with the communists 
The slowly rising international tensions after 1945 were paralleled by developments within 
the Norwegian labour movement. At some point in late 1946 or early 1947, Haakon Lie 
distributed a paper to trusted associates in the party leadership, where he sketched up a new 
propaganda strategy for the party. In regard to the communists, Lie emphasized that Labour 
had to come out on the offensive: 
It does not serve us well that our guys accept NKP as just another labour party. 
They must now take up the fight and drive out the rats everywhere where they 
have dug in. […] We can’t have a fight with the communists without 
simultaneously putting a spotlight on Russia, and the methods applied there. The 
struggle is one of principle, and we have to mark our distance to the dictatorship, 
the violent revolution, the terror and the suppression of the most fundamental 
human rights.26 
The campaign was already in motion. One of the first initiatives was the publication of the 
Chairman of the British Labour Party Harold Laski’s The Secret Battalion. Laski and General 
Secretary Morgan Phillips had visited Norway in August 1945, as the first British delegates 
ever to attend a Norwegian Labour Party congress.27 That same summer the first round of 
negotiations for a united labour party broke down and fights for control of unions ensued 
between NKP and Labour.28 Labour now framed that interparty conflict in an international 
context. Through propaganda for ‘unity’, it was claimed in Labour’s preface to The Secret 
Battalion, ‘communist parties everywhere seek to create a united front with socialist parties – 
with the aim of destroying them.’29 
In November 1946 Labour released the trade union journal Arbeidsplassen (The Work Place), 
edited and for a large part written by the Party Secretary.30 Haakon Lie had intentionally 
chosen a ‘sharp, insensitive tone’, and attacked the ‘sanctimonious’ communists for speaking 
‘the fairest words of democracy and rule of the people’, while apparently forgetting all about 
their own ideological ABC of ‘class war and the dictatorship of the proletariat’.31 From the 
first edition onwards the journal highlighted social conditions in the Soviet Union and other 
countries in Eastern Europe, contrasting policy, wages and prices with the situation in 
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Norway: ‘Both the Russian and the Norwegian governments have the tremendous task 
hanging over their heads of stopping rising prices and inflation. The numbers show how much 
better we have handled this issue.’32 The comparisons were made tangible by listing up how 
much bread, butter, sugar, textiles and shoes you could buy for the average monthly salary in 
the Soviet Union. The underlying argument was hard to miss: Was this really the worker’s 
ideal state? 
Haakon Lie’s attacks on the Soviet Union were controversial in his party. Pro-Soviet 
sentiments prevailed among many members, and ‘bridge building’ was still the official party 
policy. On grounds of its anti-Sovietism, some leaders of local party branches even protested 
the distribution of Arbeidsplassen to their members.33 Lie was a partisan in a struggle between 
loose fractions of the governing party. In this internal struggle he reaped benefits from the 
position as Party Secretary that enabled him to utilize resources from a network transcending 
both national and party borders. Until the dollars started to flow in 1948-49, in connection to 
the Marshall Plan and other US initiatives, the foreign support Lie received was in the form of 
propaganda material secured through his transnational connections. One significant example 
is his cooperation with Denis Healey, the Secretary of the International Department of the 
British Labour Party. As both were in charge of their parties’ international connections, they 
had met at socialist international conferences, at which Lie had encouraged the establishment 
of the Socialist Information and Liaison Office (SILO) that emerged as a small information 
bureau managed by Healey in London.34 Yet, in the first post-war years, the international 
socialist movement was torn between East and West, and SILO could not be used for the 
dissemination of anti-communist propaganda without taking the risk of a serious 
organisational backlash. Channels bypassing the established framework of the international 
labour movement were preferable. 
In the spring of 1947, Healey wrote the pamphlet Cards on the Table in an attempt to 
persuade party supporters of Moscow’s ‘sustained and violent offensive’ against British 
interests.35 He claimed that it was unrealistic to believe in the possibility of Britain’s 
neutrality in the emerging global conflict between the USA and the Soviet Union. Great 
Britain had to take a more pro-American position. That message was something Haakon Lie 
could use domestically to support his position in the party debate. He soon translated the 
pamphlet into Norwegian himself.36 In a letter he told Healey that he was uncertain as to 
whether the party’s Executive Committee would agree to publish it, but then a month later 




situation was changing rapidly in the summer of 1947, Lie also discussed the pamphlet with 
Kit Kenney. As some time had passed since its publication in Britain, Haakon Lie emphasized 
the need for an extra chapter to be added on the implications of Secretary of State George 
Marshall’s recent declaration of the US’ commitment to European economic recovery, and 
the subsequent international conference in Paris. In a letter to Denis Healey, Kenney 
expressed his sincere hope that Lie’s request could be met, as the Embassy attached great 
importance to the pamphlet’s circulation in Norway.38  Healey accepted and added his 
reflections on recent developments.  
Cards on the Table was published in Norway in October 1947, shortly after establishment of 
Moscow’s Communist Information Bureau (Cominform). 39  Cominform was taken as a 
general propaganda threat to US interests in Europe and represents another significant step 
towards the consolidation of antagonistic ideological blocs in Europe. Two days after the 
proclamation of Cominform, Director of the Office of European Affairs in US State 
Department, John Hickerson, summed up how the situation in Norway related to the broader 
picture, based mostly on reports from the Embassy in Oslo: 
The danger to the United States from Soviet propaganda in Norway is not in the 
field of Norwegian internal politics, but rather in the international field. It does 
not appear that the tenets of Communism itself are making great progress in 
Norway. The Social Democratic Labor Movement is vigorously led and has not 
only been successful in withstanding Communist offensives but has even 
succeeded in whittling down the Communist party strength. Where the 
Communists have had their success is in throwing doubt on the United States as a 
world leader.40 
In this regard, Hickerson highlighted the negative focus in the Norwegian press on the ‘negro 
problem’ – the segregation of African-Americans in the USA. Hickerson presumed that this 
interest was initiated or at least stimulated by communist propaganda. Another negative focus 
was that the Labour press, the leading one in Norway according to Hickerson, ‘often discusses 
the matter of capitalist economic policy in socialist terms which are unfavorable to the United 
States’.41 There was no policy response to the such propaganda ‘dangers’ to the US interest in 
Europe, but in the late fall of 1947 measures were under way.42 In the absence of an American 
propaganda policy, Haakon Lie personally put a lot of work into efforts to eradicate negative 
views of the US on grounds of its capitalism. In December, the party’s publishing house 
Tiden published Lie’s book The Labour Movement in the United States (Arbeiderbevegelsen i 
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de forente stater), presenting the American unions as an influential and progressive factor in 
the US economy. The book was filled with updated statistics and charts, probably supplied to 
Lie by the US labor attaché. In late 1947 and early 1948 Lie repeatedly emphasized the 
involvement of the American unions in what amounted to a campaign of public lectures, co-
eds and pamphlets arguing for Norwegian participation in the Marshall Plan.43 
So far, I have shown how Haakon Lie, by 1948, had sought and received propaganda support 
and material from three main sources: the British Labour Party and the British and US 
Embassies in Oslo. His competence in propaganda, his transnational network and his strategic 
position in the dominant political movement in Norway made him a valuable partner for 
Western propagandists engaged in piecemeal measures. In the following section I will explore 
how Lie’s Western connections laid the grounds for his becoming a key actor both in Norway 
and internationally when different Western state agencies initiated comprehensive propaganda 
campaigns to combat Soviet communism. Repetitive deadlocks in the UN in 1947 made it 
painfully clear for the Labour cabinet that the foundations for its foreign policy were 
crumbling under its feet. What then was the alternative for a small state like Norway that had 
its dream of neutrality burst on German bayonets in the last war? In late 1947 there were no 
defence alliances available to consider. Lie therefore eagerly awaited a new policy from the 
emerging ‘West’. When it materialized, it came with propaganda to support it. 
 
The Information Research Department 
On the 22 January 1948, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin signaled a change in British foreign 
policy. To the House of Commons, he claimed that the Soviet ‘police State’ was consolidating 
territorial gains from the war by ruthless suppression of non-communists, and yet, ‘she is not 
satisfied with this tremendous expansion’.44 To resist it, Bevin proposed a military ‘Western 
Union’ of Britain, France and the Benelux-countries – and possibly ‘other historic members 
of European civilisation’. Was the latter an invitation to Scandinavia? Haakon Lie contacted 
Denis Healey for clarification. Healey answered that it was difficult to give guidance on the 
interpretation, but that he would arrange for someone in Oslo to give Lie ‘a more authoritative 
off the record talk about it’, and after a few days he was provided a confidential brief from the 
labour attaché John Inman.45 This was likely the background for Martin Tranmæl’s editorial 
in Arbeiderbladet (The Worker’s Daily) on the 30 January, calling for decisive action and 
unity from the Western democracies, because continued ‘neutrality or passivity may lead to 




the party elite were coming to the fore as international tensions intensified. Yet, it seems, 
those attitudes did not perfectly align with the general attitudes on the party grassroot. There 
was therefore a need for propaganda to support a shift of orientation. 
The day after Bevin’s speech, the British Foreign Office sent a circular to the embassies, 
informing them that a coordinated anti-Soviet propaganda campaign would accompany the 
new foreign policy. The target audiences abroad were to be the ‘broad masses of workers and 
peasants’, and the embassies were ordered to prepare channels for dissemination.47 As the 
very existence of the campaign was cloaked in secrecy, a new Foreign Office department was 
created with the innocuous name Information Research Department (IRD) that was to base its 
dissemination of propaganda globally on confidential personal contacts.48 
While the portfolio of propaganda papers was being prepared, ambassador Laurence Collier 
in Oslo advised Ernest Bevin that the IRD had to take into account the mind-set of the locals: 
[…] as a people the Norwegians are tenacious of their established opinions, slow 
to accept new views, independently-minded and consciously wedded to the ideal 
of objectivity, with a sturdy reliance on the merits of their own judgements. 
Failing that, they may accept the views of a fellow-Norwegian, but for foreign 
views they have little use, unless they can assimilate them unconsciously and then 
regard them as Norwegian.49 
Not long after Bevin’s speech the international tensions intensified. As a reaction to the 
communist coup d’état in Czechoslovakia, Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen held a watershed 
speech at Kråkerøy on the 29th, harshly attacking the communists for threatening the freedom 
and democracy of the Norwegian people. Gerhardsen called for an open fight with 
‘democratic means and intellectual weapons’ against them - basically what Lie had argued for 
a long time.50 The consolidation of communist rule in Eastern European countries through 
evident political suppression undermined the NKP in Norway, as their real intensions were 
increasingly questioned. These developments played into the hands of Haakon Lie. 
The first IRD material reached Norwegian audiences in late April, in the form of an article by 
Lie in Arbeiderbladet on the poor living conditions of industrial workers in the Soviet Union, 
in parts based on the ‘basic paper’ The Real Conditions in Soviet Russia.51 Soon afterwards 
Kit Kenney attached Lie’s article in a report to London to show that IRD material was 
presented to target audiences, boasting that it did so from ‘the pen of the most vigorous and 
able anti-Russian propagandist in Norway’: 
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As you will see, M. Lie has a very skillful technique of laying damning facts 
about Communism before a working class audience in such a way as to give no 
impression of anti-Communist propaganda. Moreover, his method of allowing 
facts to speak for themselves is a singularly telling one and constitutes by far the 
best means of exposing the Russian regime without alienating a public which until 
quite recently was disposed a priori to be sympathetic to it. […] M. Lie has 
emphasised to me on several occasions that the main policy for our anti-
Communist publicity here must be to convince the Norwegians Labour movement 
that Communism means a sinking standard of life.52 
Haakon Lie’s fact-based strategy was in line with that of the IRD. In the Foreign Office, the 
prevailing view was that conditions in the Soviet sphere were such that exaggeration was 
unnecessary - straight news and facts about the harsh realities were sufficient, but were 
nonetheless more likely to be believed if the British source was kept secret.53 The setup of 
Lie’s article shows how he interweaved fragments from the IRD paper. He started by 
conveying personal impressions from visits to the Soviet Union in the 1930s, and then 
compared Soviet and Norwegian wages and prices in a detailed survey based on official 
statistics, just as he had done in Arbeidsplassen for well over a year. The last part of the 
article covered Soviet housing conditions based on the IRD paper, with only a few sentences 
directly translated from the original. No wonder Kit Kenney was pleased. The IRD material 
was reaching its target audiences in small portions presented by a credible local with no 
reference to the original source - exactly the practice of the ‘unconscious assimilation’ of 
foreign views and information that Laurence Collier had recommended. 
A survey from November 1948 showed that the Embassy in Oslo was making good use of the 
IRD material, and few embassies worldwide received more.54 By that time IRD basic papers 
were distributed to intellectuals, politicians and newspaper editors across the Norwegian 
political spectrum, yet, following on from the focus on the working class audience, the 
Foreign Office particularly emphasized the importance of reaching the Labour Party 
Secretary.55 Translation and publication of complete IRD papers as Labour pamphlets was 
rare, but did occur.56 As with Haakon Lie’s April article, most of the IRD material found its 
way into Norwegian articles, pamphlets and public lectures as fragments of text and 
information. 
Early on, Haakon Lie became a key contact for the IRD in Norway following on from his 




dissemination through confidential personal contacts. For years Lie had sought and received 
propaganda support from the same channel, but in the spring of 1948 a steady stream of 
propaganda papers covering a variety of topics replaced ad hoc measures. Lie used it to serve 
his own agenda, which clearly neither he nor his British partners saw as conflicting with that 
of the British Foreign Office. 
 
Comparing superpowers 
The US State Department did not respond to the Soviet propaganda challenge in the same 
coordinated fashion as the British Foreign Office, and their anti-communist propaganda was 
piecemeal and improvised for most of the period leading up to the signing of the Atlantic Pact 
in 1949.57 At the Embassy in Oslo, the United States Information Service (USIS) informed 
Norwegian press agencies on US policy and supplied documentary material throughout the 
period, one example being the broad distribution of photos covering the Western airlift to 
Berlin during the Soviet blockade in 1948, but more targeted anti-communist and anti-Soviet 
propaganda was rare.58 However, there was one significant exception comprising an effort 
involving the Norwegian Labour Party of extraordinary importance to State Department. 
Intriguingly, it all started with a Soviet initiative. 
In July 1948, the Norwegian trade union federation (Arbeidernes Faglige Landsorganisasjon –
AFL) received an invitation from the Soviet central organization of labour unions to send a 
delegation to the Soviet Union. The invitation was obviously based on hopes of a positive 
propaganda effect abroad but would backfire spectacularly. The invitation was laid before the 
party-union cooperative committee, who accepted it.59 In the middle of August, a delegation 
left for a three-week trip to Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad and Sochi. The decision that the 
delegation’s impressions would result in a report aroused interest from the US Embassy in 
Oslo, who noted that all delegates were entirely ‘anti-communist’.60 After they returned, the 
Embassy reported on promising public statements by the delegation’s leader, Trond Hegna, 
who would edit the upcoming report. ‘There is probably no other country in the world’ the 
Embassy quoted Hegna, ‘where the authorities hold the nation’s living standard so 
mercilessly and deliberately low in order to accomplish the objectives of reconstruction’. 
Hegna’s emphasis on the Soviet top-down dictation of collective labour agreements, the 
militarization of society, the calculated isolation vis-à-vis the outside world and the poor 
living conditions for workers, clearly impressed the Embassy, who praised his ‘well-
developed faculties of observation’.61  
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It is safe to assume that Trond Hegna’s sober comparisons of Norwegian and Soviet prices, 
wages and housing conditions were influenced by the approach Haakon Lie had pioneered 
since early 1947. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether Lie had any direct involvement in the 
appointment of the delegation or its report. However, he and US embassy personnel in Oslo 
soon realized and tried to exploit its propaganda potential. In late November, AFL decided to 
send a second union delegation abroad; this time to the USA, led by Haakon Lie himself.62 
The goal was clearly to draw a revealing comparison between the two superpowers. With this 
aim, Lie cooperated with the newly established European Cooperation Administration (ECA) 
in Oslo, which sponsored the trip to the USA. It was one of the first, if not the first, of many 
Marshall-aid sponsored European labour delegations to America over the coming years.63 Just 
before the delegation left in late December, Lie informed the ECA mission that their 
organization could freely translate and publicly use the first delegation’s report, as well as the 
future report from the delegation to the USA.64 
On the 30 December 1948 the US Embassy in Oslo forwarded a translated version of the first 
report to State Department and the US Embassy in Moscow, and Ambassador Charles Bay 
commented on its domestic importance in Norway:  
Though the report itself is couched in matter-of-fact language, it is political 
dynamite in Norway, since its middle section thoroughly demolishes Norwegian 
Communist claims that the Russian economic system provides a substantial 
standard of living for the workers and equitably distributes the products of 
Russian industry […] It is the feeling of Labor Party officials that this down-to-
earth, bread-and-butter exposé is just what they need to help to hammer home an 
understanding of what the Soviet system means for the working class.65 
A few weeks later, the Minister at the Embassy in Moscow, Foy Kohler, responded to the 
report, claiming that it represented an ‘almost unparalleled propaganda opportunity’: ‘If this 
report from convincing source speaking in simple language and with penetrating insight about 
matters of major interest [for] common people everywhere could be placed in hands [of] 
every American and European worker, it would be worth an army.’66 In February, as the State 
Department was preparing dissemination of the full report, the Soviet newspaper Trud 
attacked Trond Hegna for being a ‘pupil’ of the Nazi propagandist Joseph Goebbels and a 
servant of the US bourgeoisie, who ‘lies, pretends, betrays and slanders at every step’. This 
fierce denunciation led Kohler to believe that Soviet authorities were ‘seriously hit in 




In early March 1949, the full text of the Norwegian report from the Soviet Union was 
disseminated by the State Department to diplomatic stations around the globe in the Soviet 
Affair Notes, which resembled the British IRD’s basic papers.68 In the adjoining circular, 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson recommended maximum use of this ‘especially important’ 
report, and indicated that advantageous comparisons could soon be made with the upcoming 
Norwegian delegation report from the USA. Two months later, the ECA’s office in Paris 
disseminated the translated report from the Soviet Union to all countries participating in the 
Marshall Plan, praising it as the ‘most important single piece of ammunition we have so far 
obtained for use in opposing Communist efforts to block recovery by political disruption’.69 
After an extended period of waiting and repeated requests from Acheson to the Embassy in 
Oslo, the report from the delegation to the US, authored by Haakon Lie, was finally published 
in early June both in Norwegian for distribution to the unions and in English for foreign 
audiences.70 Not surprisingly, the report was positive, focusing mainly on the high wages and 
good living standard of American workers. However, it also covered what the Norwegians 
saw as fundamental challenges to American society, especially the problematic race relations. 
USA was ‘still wrestling with many and great problems’, the report concluded, yet it was 
‘moving forward both culturally, socially and economically’.71 The translated version of the 
report clearly satisfied State Department, as it was soon distributed to US diplomatic missions 
and consulates on all continents.72 Not long thereafter, highlights from the two reports were 
published in one joint pamphlet by the ECA’s information office in Paris for dissemination in 
non-communist Europe.73 
On the two Norwegian union reports’ long road to global audiences, the Labour party 
congress of February 1949 decided that Norway would sign the North Atlantic Treaty, and 
soon thereafter broad parliamentary support was secured. The Gerhardsen cabinet had 
negotiated with the Danish and Swedish governments for months in order to accomplish a 
Scandinavian defence union, but the effort floundered when meeting Swedish resistance to 
formal military cooperation with the Western powers. The joining of an alliance with the 
Western capitalist powers was controversial in the party, and Prime Minister Gerhardsen had 
therefore rushed the final decision before an opposition had time to get off the ground.74 
The USA and Great Britain did little in terms of propaganda to influence Norwegian labour 
audiences in favor of Western military alignment before the 1950s. There is evidence of 
cautious approaches towards the Minister of Foreign Affairs Halvard Lange concerning 
propaganda in 1948-49, but it came to nothing.75 A series of party publications supported the 
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shift in foreign policy orientation, but no documentation has been found to suggest that these 
were supported in any way by the Western embassies. This further supports the impression 
that the Western great powers were cautious to avoid giving any impression that the 
Norwegians were pressured into joining NATO. 
The dramatic escalation of the Cold War in 1948 and the signing of the Atlantic Pact in early 
1949 did not result in an immediate increase in US anti-Soviet propaganda abroad. In 1949 
the British Embassy and the British Labour Party were still Haakon Lie’s major foreign 
suppliers of propaganda more directly attacking the Soviet Union and communism. The US 
State Department was still reluctant to go beyond public diplomacy, that of mostly open and 
sober presentation of American society, politics and culture, and establish exchange programs 
for workers, engineers, students, academics and military officers. In a biannual report in the 
summer of 1949, the British Embassy reported to London that little was seen of US pamphlets 
and booklets in Norway.76 Within a year, that would change dramatically. 
 
The ‘Campaign of Truth’ 
In April 1950, President Harry Truman launched the ‘Campaign of Truth’ to counter alleged 
Soviet ‘deceit, distortion, and lies’ on the global scene.77 The campaign was intensified after 
the outbreak of war in Korea in June and resulted in a flood of fresh resources. From 1950 
onwards, two of the most important US objectives in Norway were to secure governmental 
and public support for the Western alliance and to develop the country’s ‘ability and 
willingness’ to oppose the Soviet Union ideologically and militarily.78 Since much of the 
remaining ‘misunderstanding of the United States and distrust of its motives’ was to be found 
among the working class, and since the Labour Party dominated national political life after 
securing its parliamentary majority in the elections of 1949, the Norwegian working class and 
union members were the ‘first priority target’ for the US propagandists in Norway.79 One way 
to influence this key audience was to supply Labour officials with the State Department’s 
Soviet Affair Notes, whilst another was to engage in broad propaganda efforts to reach the 
working class in general.80 
Haakon Lie seized the new opportunities. Labour’s party publications had for years been 
characterized by black and white texts on cheap brown paper. In the wake of the Campaign of 
Truth, the quality of the party’s pamphlets improved radically, as better paper, smart charts, 




circulation figures soared. In October 1950, the US Embassy in Oslo reported that they had 
produced pamphlets for distribution through the Norwegian labour movement to consolidate 
popular support for the UN’s action in Korea, to boost support for NATO, to lift moral and to 
counter ‘the spirit of growing defeatism’.81 As the front moved rapidly back and forth on the 
Korean peninsula in the summer and fall of 1950, Labour released the colorful pamphlets War 
in Korea (Krig i Korea), legitimizing the US led UN-coalition for the defense of South Korea, 
and Danger Ahead (Fare på ferde), arguing for heavier taxes for military spending in 
Norway. Both were printed in high numbers (150 000 and 200 000 respectively) and 
distributed to all branches of the Labour Party.82 About the same time, Labour published the 
pamphlets Slave Labour in the East (Slavearbeid i øst) and Nuclear Energy − for War or 
Peace? (Atomenergi for krig eller fred?). The latter criticized the alleged Soviet reluctance to 
accept international nuclear arms control and presenting the productive potential of 
radionuclides supplied to friendly states by the United States. None of the pamphlets stated 
any foreign support. 
Embassy reports and correspondence reveals that the US Embassy in Oslo supported all of 
these pamphlets, either creatively, financially or both. In the 1990s, confronted with 
documentary traces of his collusion with the US embassy personnel in making the pamphlets 
on the Korean War and nuclear energy, Lie conceded to having written them together with the 
US Press Attaché Theodore Olson and let the US Embassy cover costs for printing and 
distribution. It was a quite natural thing to do, claimed Lie, as Olson was a close friend and 
the Americans ‘our allies who we totally depended on’.83 Even so, Lie did not see any reason 
to inform the common party members of the propaganda cooperation between the Party 
Office and the US Embassy. Neither did he inform his comrades in Labour’s Nordic sister 
parties that the pamphlet Peace with Freedom (Fred med frihet), published as a part of their 
joint social democratic ‘peace campaign’ in January 1951, was in fact a result of his 
cooperation with the Americans − a delicate matter as both Finland and Sweden were 
formally neutral in the Cold War.84 
The US support for Labour pamphlets came to a halt by the end of 1950, about the same time 
as Haakon Lie’s primary contact at the US Embassy, Theodore Olson, left Norway. Half a 
year later the Embassy reported that the lack of any competent replacement to run the 
Campaign of Truth had left the USIE organization ineffective at the very time it most required 
full-fledged operation.85 Furthermore, in the following years the Embassy repeatedly stressed 
to the State Department that excessive propaganda could backfire on the grounds of the 
 Article three: Propaganda ‘Worth an Army’   
 
 18 
Norwegians’ psychological ‘over-sensitivity’ to it.86 This attitude goes a long way towards 
explaining the Embassy’s emphasis on open ‘public diplomacy’ rather than covert 
propaganda after the short period of frenzied activity in 1950. 
So far, I have showed how Haakon Lie, by 1950, established himself as the key contact of the 
US and British propagandists targeting the Norwegian working class. This made him an 
influential and maybe indispensable intermediary with heavy influence on the initiation, 
creation, translation, adaptation and strategic targeting of that propaganda − a powerful and 
critical editor. His growing transnational propaganda network, the escalation of the Cold War, 
and the establishment of Western propaganda campaigns gave Lie an ever-wider supply to 
choose from. Next, I will explore the culmination of Lie’s work as a critical editor of Western 
propaganda in the early Cold War, his connection to the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) 
cultural front. 
 
Propaganda for cultural freedom 
In late June 1950, Haakon Lie was invited to participate at the Congress for Cultural 
Freedom’s (CCF) first conference held in West Berlin, after being recommended to one of the 
central initiators, Melvin Lasky, by the German social democrat Willy Brandt.87 Brandt was 
well known to Lie from his years of exile in Norway (1933–40), and was working as a 
correspondent for Arbeiderbladet. Lie accepted the invitation and went to Berlin with a few 
other party comrades. The Congress was an idealistic initiative by mostly left-wing 
intellectuals, yet from the outset was intimately entangled with the power politics of the Cold 
War. From the start, the CIA covertly supported the CCF organizationally and financially. In 
the early 1950s the organization grew to become a key institution of the international 
propaganda wars, much thanks to its seemingly unlimited funds, which Lie was eager to 
exploit for his party projects in Norway. Haakon Lie’s experience as an organizer with special 
expertise in anti-communist propaganda was presumably decisive when he was given a seat in 
the panel on the second day of the Berlin congress together with a handful of famous 
intellectuals, academics and politicians. Following the conference, he became the alternate 
member of the Executive Committee for the American unionist Irving Brown, and in 1950-53 
participated in meetings and conferences in Brussels, Versailles, Paris, Stockholm and 
Rome.88 Until the mid-1950s, he corresponded with François Bondy, Michael Josselson, 




were on the CIA’s payroll and knew it.89 The evidence is inconclusive as to whether or not 
Lie himself knew that CCF’s funds stemmed to a large extent from the CIA.  
 
The Hungarian-British writer Arthur Koestler giving his keynote speech at the Congress for Cultural Freedom in West Berlin on the 27th of 
June 1950. The panel in front, from the right: Sidney Hook, Alfred Weber, Jules Romain, Ernst Reuter and the man looking at Koestler, 
Norwegian Labour Party secretary Haakon Lie. Photo: The University of Chicago Library. 
 
Lie wanted to make the organization a facilitator of propaganda primarily directed towards 
international working-class audiences. At the meeting in Brussels in late November 1950, he 
argued for a general line similar to the one he had pioneered in Norway:  
We have to work among the masses. […] It is not a question of standard of living 
only. The Communists are strongest among metal workers who are the best paid 
workers. In order to fight Communism it is important to kill the myth of Soviet 
Russia as Soviet community.90 
What then was the most effective way to ‘kill the myth’? Lie’s answer, judging by his 
statements in the CCF forum and his propaganda activities of the period, suggest that it was to 
expose the Soviet forced labour camp system (the GULag). At the meeting at Versailles in 
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February 1951, Lie strongly encouraged focus on the Soviet ‘slave labour’ camps, comparing 
the situation with the 1930s when many people did not quite believe in the existence of Nazi 
concentration camps.91 The first CCF-related publication in Norway did indeed focus on the 
similarities between the German and Soviet camp systems, as Tiden in April 1951 published 
Lie’s CCF acquaintance, ex-communist Margarete Buber-Neumann’s Under two dictators – 
Prisoner of Stalin and Hitler (Fange hos Stalin og Hitler) and in May Lie arranged a party 
publicity tour for the German author in Norway.92 Whether it was Lie’s accomplishment or 
not, the CCF also focused on the GULag in one of its first realized publications: Les Procès 
des Camps de Concentration Soviétiques – the protocols of a French defamation lawsuit on 
the existence of ‘concentration camps’ in the Soviet Union.  
In the preparation phase of the organization in the autumn and winter of 1950-51, CCF 
officials clearly acknowledged Haakon Lie’s pioneer propaganda work, and tried to benefit 
from it. Many titles in a tentative portfolio of pamphlets presented in Brussels, covering a 
variety of topics ranging from the ‘Truth about the totalitarian world’ to ‘Problems of the Free 
World’, were conspicuously similar to previous initiatives by Norwegian Labour, which 
suggests that Lie had considerable influence on the making of the list.93 Another indication of 
his influence on CCF’s early publication work is the organization’s preparation of a pamphlet 
on ‘social justice on both sides of the Iron Curtain’, focusing on ‘level of life, wages, buying 
capacity, working conditions, freedom of work and domicile, freedom of travelling, feeding, 
housing’.94 It is reasonable to assume this pamphlet was inspired by Lie’s down-to-earth East-
West comparisons in Norway (and the Norwegian union delegation reports of 1948-49). A 
letter where CCF Executive Secretary René Lalive d’Epinay presented the project to Lie 
supports that assumption. He claimed to know that Lie was ‘in possession of even more 
important’ documentation than that which the CCF had already gathered, and kindly asked 
him to send all documents that might be of interest.95  
Furthermore, Lie was also a network connector for the CCF. In spring 1951, he invited the 
CCF to contribute to a campaign he had initiated through the Committee of the International 
Socialist Conference (COMISCO) for the release of the Hungarian social democratic political 
prisoner Anna Kéthly. Lie remarked to the CCF’s Swiss Publication Officer François Bondy 
that nothing was more important than to ‘symbolize the fight against tyranny in one single 
person suffering from it’, to which Bondy responded positively and promised to secure media 




In Lie’s correspondence with Bondy in the fall of 1950 and into 1951, there were sporadic 
mentions of CCF channeling of funds for his publication activities in Norway. In a letter in 
October, Bondy made it clear that the Paris office did not demand to be credited for its future 
contributions. Rather, the publications could ‘just as well appear sponsored by trade unions – 
like your pamphlet which I am expecting.’97 This comment most likely referred to the War in 
Korea pamphlet, that had been mentioned in earlier correspondence, and indicates that Bondy 
was informed about the US Embassy in Oslo’s support for Labour’s propaganda and 
envisioned similar arrangements with Lie in the future.98 The fact that the Labour controlled-
parliament, as a measure against potential (communist) fifth columnists, had criminalized 
citizens receiving ‘economic support to influence the public opinion about the state’s form of 
government or foreign policy or for party purposes’ in the interest of ‘a foreign power, party 
or organization’ in December 1950, made financial propaganda support to Labour’s Party 
Secretary a delicate matter.99 However, Lie clearly wanted to keep the connection to secure 
such support for activities in Norway. This might explain why, in the spring of 1951, he saw a 
need for another outlet of his propaganda, independent of both the official party publisher and 
Tiden. Here he could exert complete control over the publishing process and, probably most 
importantly, the ledger. 
 
The ghost editor 
The publishing activities of Fram Publishing House would be the culmination of Haakon 
Lie’s work as a critical editor in the early Cold War. As the ghost editor (his editorship of 
Fram was seldom, if ever, stated publicly), Lie controlled all parts of the publishing process 
from the selection of suitable material from mostly foreign sources to the translation and 
tailoring of the material for Norwegian audiences, and finally the important publicity work. 
The latter was facilitated by his key position in the nation’s dominant political organization, 
his influence on party journalists, and Fram’s access to free advertisement in local and 
national party newspapers. 
Haakon Lie exerted decisive influence on all parts of CCF’s activities towards Norway, 
personally selecting material and often requesting fundamental changes or the initiation of 
new projects. Letters in April, as preparations were being made for Fram, illustrate the 
different ways he exerted his influence. Most CCF proposals in this period were dismissed by 
Lie, even particularly recommended material was rejected as ‘too special for our country’. Lie 
saw one pamphlet, on the rearmament of Soviet satellite countries, as useful as long as the 
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emphasis was turned exclusively towards the situation in Germany, an issue that was ‘brought 
up at every single union meeting’.100 Haakon Lie found that it was better to use the CCF 
documentation in a series of three or four articles in the Labour press, but François Bondy 
insisted that a ‘black book’ would be more impressive and more widely read. Bondy 
emphasized that this did not exclude publishing the same material in a series of articles.101 
This solution clearly satisfied Lie. In the summer of 1951, Fram published the pamphlet A 
New Wehrmacht Marching (En ny Wehrmacht marsjerer) and about the same time a series of 
articles on the East German ‘Volkspolizei’ appeared in Arbeiderbladet signed by 
correspondent Willy Brandt.102 
Haakon Lie’s propaganda cooperation with the CCF both narrowly targeted selected party and 
union officials and broadly aimed at the party’s rank-and-file and the Norwegian working 
class in general. An example of this is a letter where Lie requested 50 copies of the CCF-
associated German journal Ost-Probleme for distribution to carefully selected people. At the 
same time, Lie presented the estimated production cost of a Norwegian translation of the 
French ‘concentration camps’ lawsuit with a circulation of 10 000, of which Bondy 
approved.103 Haakon Lie had ambitious plans for his cooperation with the CCF in 1951. Far 
from all projects were realized. The most prominent of these were the establishment of a 
monthly Norwegian magazine published by Fram and aimed at the ‘intellectual elite’, in line 
with the CCF journals Preuves and Kontakte and using translated material from these 
journals, an idea discussed by Bondy, Lie and Irving Brown.104 ‘The journal should aim at 
influencing intelectuals [sic], fellow-travellers and wavering members of the Communist 
Party in Norway’, Lie emphasized, and this called ‘for a careful selection of material. The 
magazine must from its very start acquire the reputation for being 100 % reliable. Its 
effectiveness will entirely depend upon the weight of the facts it brings out’.105 Haakon Lie 
indicated a 6000-dollar annual budget. Why this magazine did not see the light of day is 
unclear, as Lie’s CCF contacts were positive, but a comment by Lie that they would probably 
know in a few weeks if they could go ahead indicates that he needed party approval for such 
an ambitious plan. Presumably, Lie did not get such an approval, as there were no mentions of 
the magazine after the correspondence with Paris in August.  
Other initiatives, mostly publications of books and pamphlets, did materialize and most often 
the CCF covered the expenses for translation into Norwegian. Two of Fram’s 1951 
publications centered on the very topic Lie found most useful to ‘kill the myth’ of the Soviet 




‘concentration camps’ was given the grandiose title Slave Labour in the 20th Century 
(Slavearbeid i det 20. århundre). The other publication, Ragnar Rudfalk’s book I Worked in 
the Soviet Union (Jeg har arbeidet i Sovjet), was bought from the Swedish social democratic 
publisher Tidens Förlag. Rudfalk, a Swede, had survived years in Soviet forced labour camps 
and also worked for a period in a kolkhoz (collective farm), and Lie expected his story would 
become ‘a real hit’ in Norway.106 By publishing Rudfalk, Lie pioneered in Norway a new 
GULag-literature sub-genre of Scandinavian autobiographies on experiences in the Soviet 
camps. This genre localized the abstract horrors of the vast camp system and became popular 
among Norwegian readers, peaking with the 1956 bestselling book Moscow Knows No Tears 
(Moskva kjenner ingen tårer) about the Norwegian partisan Osvald Harjo’s thirteen long 
years in Soviet camps, co-written by Lie’s close associate Paul Engstad. 
Haakon Lie’s enthusiasm for the CCF connection seems to have been dampened after the first 
year and a half of the organization’s existence, and his correspondence with the CCF became 
more sporadic. In the fall of 1951, different publications were discussed and costs estimated, 
but this all came to nothing. However, Lie continued to receive magazines and publication 
proposals on a regular basis, and on occasions contacted Paris if he regarded material suited 
for publication or to request the creation of material. Over the next years Fram published a 
few publications a year, some of which did not have any direct connection to the CCF. 
Nevertheless, the general impression is that the organization was by far the most important 
foreign contributor and supplier to Fram. One notable example is the sociologist Philip 
Selznick’s The Organizational Weapon – A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics, which 
was published as The Cadre Party (Kaderpartiet) in 1954. It created a massive controversy in 
Norway, but the CCF financial support for royalties and translation was kept secret – 
probably to great relief for both Haakon Lie and his CIA partners in Paris.107 It would be one 
of Fram’s last publications.  
To the regret of Michael Josselson, Lie withdrew from the CCF’s Executive Committee in 
February 1955.108 Lie had expressed doubt about the expediency of his participation since 
back in January 1952, on grounds of the CCF’s focus on artists and intellectuals rather than 
workers.109 In October 1953, Lie asked to be replaced and thanked the CCF for all the support 
in ‘the form of valuable publications which would never have appeared without your advice 
and help’.110 On behalf of Irving Brown, Denis de Rougemont, Nikolas Nabokov and himself, 
Josselson politely asked Lie to at least delay the final decision until after a meeting in Rome 
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in November.111 Lie was swayed and did indeed participate in Rome, but it would be his last 
appearance in a CCF forum. 
Fram’s publications covering Cold War topics came to a halt soon after Lie’s withdrawal 
from the CCF Executive Committee and the fizzling out of correspondence with Paris. It is 
likely that Lie did not see the same need for Fram after his withdrawal from the CCF and the 
drying up of dollar funds. Furthermore, the fierce anti-communist stance Lie had fought for 
years for was quite unrivalled in the party by the mid 1950s. The communists were not 
considered a serious threat to either the Norwegian political system or Labour’s dominance 
within it. In this atmosphere, Lie might have sensed, or been told, that his relentless attacks on 
the communists were reaching a saturation point and that the propaganda should be relaxed in 
order to avoid overkill. 
 
Conclusion 
The Norwegian Labour Party’s contributions to the early transnational Cold War propaganda 
networks went well beyond Norway’s position as a small-state actor in international affairs. 
The party, through its activist Party Secretary, was heavily involved with most major Western 
agencies and organizations engaged in propaganda internationally: the British Labour Party, 
British and US foreign services, the ECA and CCF. By studying different but related 
Norwegian and Western initiatives and campaigns over a relatively long period of time this 
article provides a comprehensive overview of the shifting strategic emphases and goals of the 
propagandists involved. New sources, most notably those showing the creation and far-
reaching dissemination of the Norwegian labour reports in 1948-49, gives new insight into the 
dynamics of the global propaganda conflict in the earliest phase of the Cold War. 
The Norwegian Labour Party’s Cold War connections to Western foreign and secret services 
have been hotly debated among Norwegian historians and in the general public for decades 
and much speculation have centered on the character of Haakon Lie’s connections to the CIA. 
The question that looms large in the background is whether or not the Labour Party Secretary 
was an American agent. In light of evidence presented in this article, it makes little sense to 
speak of the self-reliant and independently minded Lie as an agent for foreign powers. In an 
interview late in his life, former US labor attaché Walter Galenson was asked whether the US 
Embassy in Oslo had used Haakon Lie. He replied that Lie had used the embassy more than 




service […] So he used me, yeah, but it was very good propaganda for the United States’.112 
This quote touches some key points that should be made about the Norwegian Labour Party 
and Haakon Lie’s propaganda cooperation with the US embassy throughout the period 1945-
55, and also applies to the cooperation with Lie’s other American and British suppliers of 
propaganda. 
First, there was a striking sense of community and common purpose among the governmental, 
semi-governmental and non-governmental elite personnel from the United States, Great 
Britain and Norway engaged in these activities. They had found each other as a result of 
common interests, and it seems that all of them got what they wanted from the cooperation 
with few, if any, downsides. The latter were of course to a large extent due to the secrecy 
surrounding the arrangements. Second, Haakon Lie was a remarkably independent and 
influential actor in the activities. He was often the initiator of the contact and the first mover 
on a wide range of initiatives. This was most evidently the case with his propaganda in 1945-
47, before the British and US governments engaged in comprehensive campaigns against 
Communism and the Soviet Union, but was also the case when these great powers did fully 
engage in such activities. By virtue of his abilities as an organizer, network builder and 
propagandist, his vehemently anti-communist and anti-Soviet attitudes and, most importantly, 
his key political position, Lie was quite indispensable for Western propagandists following on 
from their emphasis on certain target audiences in Norway. It is indeed hard to imagine that 
the British and Americans could have reached the labour movement and the working class as 
broadly and effectively as they did without active partnership with Lie. This gave him the 
authority of a critical editor over all aspects of the propaganda publishing process targeting 
the Norwegian labour movement and working class. His abilities and contacts also gave him 
influence on propaganda activities that went well beyond the borders of Norway. 
The Western propaganda support was sought after and welcomed by the most influential 
propagandist in the Norwegian labour movement, probably mostly due to the fact that Lie, as 
a local intermediary, had the final say in all the important matters from the creation to the 
selection, translation and targeting of the material. As such, the Western influence through 
propaganda in the dominant political movement in Norway should be seen as a cultural 
‘empire by invitation’ where a peripheral actor played a decisive role.113 I hold that the 
Western propagandists’ flexibility and willingness to let their Labour counterparts have the 
final say in all aspects of these propaganda activities to a great extent explains their 
remarkable reach. As a byproduct of the close cooperation with the Norwegian Labour Party, 
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Western propagandists got hold of material ‘worth an army’ in their fight against 
Communism and the Soviet Union, and subsequently placed it in the hands of workers around 
the globe. 
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